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reflected in the discursive behavior of a scalar adjectival construction*
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Abstract:One of the main tasks in cognitive anthropology is the reconstruction of cultural models, which are behavior-
regulating schematic cognitive models that are intersubjectively shared in a community. Given their behavior-
regulatory  status,  cognitive  anthropologists  and  other  cognitive  scientists  have  developed  methods  of
inferring cultural models from observed behavior – in particular, observed verbal behavior (including both
spoken and  written  language).  While  there  are  plenty of  studies  of  the  reflection  of  cultural  models  in
artificially generated verbal  behavior,  not  much research has  been made into the possibility of  inferring
cultural models from naturally occurring verbal behavior as documented in language corpora. Even rarer are
such  corpus-based  studies  of  the  interaction  between  cultural  models  and  constructions.  Exploring  the
usability of corpus data and methodology in the observation of constructional discursive behavior, the present
paper  offers  a  covarying  collexeme  analysis  of  the  [too ADJ  to V]-construction  in  the  Corpus  of
Contemporary  American  English.  The  purpose  is  to  discover  the  extent  to  which  its  force-dynamic
constructional semantics interacts with cultural models. We focus on three instantiations of the construction –
namely, [too young to V], [too proud to V], and [too macho to V] – to see whether there are patterns in their
ranges of coattracted verbs that are indicative of force-dynamic relations in cultural models of AGE, PRIDE, and
MACHISMO respectively.
Keywords: corpus linguistics, covarying collexeme, cultural model, scalar adjectival construction.
1. Introduction
One of the main tasks in cognitive anthropology is the reconstruction of cultural models. Cultural
models are cognitive structures, which Quinn & Holland (1987: 4) define as "presupposed, taken
for granted models of the world that are widely shared … by members of a society and that play an
enormous role in their  understanding of the world and their behavior in it".  Indeed, a common
method of identification and reconstruction of cultural models in cognitive anthropology is to infer
them from observed behavior. In particular, cognitive anthropologists and researchers within related
cognitive  sciences,  such  as  cognitive  linguistics  and  cognitive  psychology,  have  developed  a
number of methods of inferring cultural models from verbal behavior, including the use of interview
data and language-oriented questionnaires. The term 'verbal' is sometimes used with reference to
spoken communication only, contrasting it with written communication. Another sense of 'verbal',
however, refers to language use and products of language use in general, including both speech and
writing (much like the way it is used in the term 'verbal art'). In the present paper, it is the latter
sense of 'verbal'  that applies. 'Verbal behavior'  in this paper,  then,  refers to spoken and written
language use as social behavior by members of a speech community.
Corpus data document naturally occurring language in fairly naturalistic settings (i.e. written
and spoken language that occurs in actual discourse, serving actual communicative purposes, as
opposed to language elicited in experimental settings). Gries (2009: 8) offers a brilliant definition of
the naturalistic nature of the texts in a corpus: "The texts were spoken or written for some authentic
communicative purpose, but not for the purpose of putting them into the corpus". With this in mind,
it stands to reason that corpus data and methodology should be particularly useful. However, aside
from work by Gries & Stefanowitsch (2004) and Stefanowitsch (2004), there has not been much
research on cultural models as reflected in corpus data. Of course, there is plenty of corpus-based
research that addresses cultural issues, such as Leech & Fallon (1992), Ooi (2000), and Elsness
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(2013). While the notion of cultural models does not figure in such studies, they do clearly show
that verbal behavior, as defined in this paper, is indeed reflective of underlying cultural systems and
that  corpus  data  and  methods  constitute  a  way  to  rigorously,  empirically,  and  systematically
investigate  the  language-culture  interrelation.  As  Ooi's  (2000)  study  of  collocations  in  Asian
Englishes shows, pairings of lexemes may display behavior reflective of cultural concepts. Given
that, in a cognitive linguistic perspective, it  is now more or less accepted that constructions are
meaningful  units  of  grammar  that  serve  various  communicative  functions,  we can  assume that
constructions,  like  collocations,  may  also  display  discursive  behavior  which  is  reflective  of
underlying cultural systems.
This is the issue that this article addresses. In particular, we are interested in observing ways
in which the discursive behavior of one specific construction may reveal aspects of underlying
cultural models – namely, the [too ADJ to V]-construction, which in itself has not been extensively
explored (but see Fortuin 2013, 2014). Consider the following examples, which were extracted from
the Corpus of Contemporary American English, or COCA (available at Davies 2014):
(1) The  tatty  furniture  betrayed  elegant  lines,  and  the  windows,  too  grimy  to  see  through,
stretched up ten feet. (COCA 2011 FIC Bk:NeverGentleman)
(2) They're too slow to catch a seal in open water. (COCA 2011 MAG NationalGeographic)
(3) One day I moved boulders in a sleet storm. There were nearly a hundred of them and they
were too heavy to lift, so I had to stay down on my knees the whole day pushing them an inch
or two at a time. (COCA 1995 FIC HarpersMag)
In  all  three  examples  the  construction  seems  to  specify  a  force-dynamic  relation  between  the
adjective and the verb in which the adjective is assigned a high degree of the attribute it expresses
(henceforth  ADJNESS).  The  force-dynamic  relation  lies  in  this  high  degree  of  ADJNESS being
construed as having a preventive effect on the situation expressed by the  to-infinitive clause that
follows. In all three cases, the relation of PREVENTION is arguably quite logical and based on more or
less  universal  experiences.  A high  degree  of  GRIMINESS naturally  prevents  people  from seeing
through a window, and it also seems quite natural that a high degree of SLOWNESS should prevent
someone  from  catching  seals  in  open  water,  or  any  other  fast-moving  entity  in  any  other
environment. Lastly, an excess of HEAVINESS should quite naturally make the heavy entity difficult to
lift. Now, compare the above examples to the following ones:
(4) Rabbi Feinstein's legal judgment with respect to romantic love among persons too young to
marry was definitive. (COCA 2007 NEWS NYTimes)
(5) I'm in a certain group that's almost too old to hire. (COCA 2011 NEWS Denver)
(6) He just smiled, too polite to answer. (COCA 2009 NEWS Denver)
The same type of preventive force-dynamic relation between the adjectives and verbs applies here,
but, in these examples, the semantic relations are arguably not based on natural relations of force-
dynamics,  but  seem to  be  filtered  through  cultural  perception.  For  instance,  the  age  at  which
marriage is appropriate depends on the parameters of  MARRIAGE established within the culture in
question.  Likewise,  exactly when someone is  too old to hire is  likely to depend on a range of
cultural parameters, and what is considered polite and impolite in which situations and exactly what
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constitutes POLITENESS itself may vary from culture to culture. In other words, the behavior of [too
ADJ to V] in examples (4)-(6) seems to link up with, and be reflective of, and perhaps regulated by,
underlying cultural models of AGE and POLITENESS.
In this article, we will investigate, via observation of its behavior in  COCA, the extent to
which the [too ADJ  to V]-construction may be said to interact with such force-dynamic cultural
models. Concurrently, we will explore the usability of corpus data and methodology in inferring
cultural models from verbal behavior. It should be mentioned that, out of the two purposes of the
present article, the latter is the primary one. This study is primarily an exploratory one and, while a
number of interesting findings pertaining to the interaction between the construction and cultural
models that draw on the relation of  PREVENTION do emerge from our data, this is by no means an
exhaustive or definitive analysis of the construction and its relation to cultural models in American
culture.
This article is structures as follows. Section 2 addresses and defines cultural models and also
touch upon their reflection in verbal behavior. Section 3 offers a brief description of the [too ADJ to
V]-construction within a construction grammar framework, based on Jensen (2014a; see also Jensen
2014b),  while  chapter  4  accounts  for  the  data  and  method  applied  in  the  present  study.  The
following three chapters address how the following instantiations of the construction may, in their
discursive behavior, be reflective of underlying cultural models: [too young to V], [too proud to V],
and [too macho to V]. While there are other instantiations, in which force-dynamic cultural models
emerge  in  the  construction's  discursive  behavior  (i.e.  patterns  of  usage)  associated,  these  three
particular instantiations were selected, because the underlying attributes expressed by the adjectives
young,  proud, and  macho are presumably tied in with a number of cultural values, thus making
them particularly  suitable  case  studies  for  the  exploration  of  the  usability  of  corpus  data  and
methodology in inferring cultural models. 
2. Cultural models
This  section  provides  a  definition  of  the  notion  of  a  cultural  model.  While  there  is  plenty  of
literature  within  cognitive  anthropology  and  other  cognitive  sciences  that  deals  with  cultural
models, the definition offered here draws on scholars whose work is particularly relevant – in terms
of theory,  method, or both – to the study of cultural  models and their relation to language and
interaction.
On  Quinn  &  Holland's  (1987:  4)  definition  above,  cultural  models  are  both  social  and
cognitive, as they are constitutive of the encyclopedic knowledge of the world associated with the
worldview of a society or community.  The encyclopedic nature of cultural  models is central  in
Kronenfeld's (2008: 69) statement that cultural models "provide scenarios or action plans for how to
behave  in  some  given  situation  or  how  to  interpret  the  behavior  of  others  in  one  or  another
situation". Likewise, in their study of cultural models of education in America in three different
ethnic perspectives, Fryberg & Markus (2007: 214) point out that cultural models are behavior-
mediating and -regulating "taken-for-granted patterns of ideas and practices" which are derived
from previous experiences. Cultural models thus cover "cultural assumptions and meanings that are
available in particular contexts" (Fryberg & Markus 2007: 215). As D'Andrade (1981: 182) reminds
us,  cultural  models  are  experiential  also in  the sense that  they are  shaped via  "repeated  social
transmission".1
From these definitions,  it  follows that  cultural  models influence the understanding of the
world within a given society and that cultural models are both experientially acquired and socially
1 D'Andrade  (1981),  drawing  on  a  BRAIN-COMPUTER analogy,  actually  uses  the  term  'cultural  program',  but  his
description of such 'cultural programs' overlaps considerably with the definitions of 'cultural schemata',  'cultural
models' and 'folk models' offered elsewhere in the literature within cognitive anthropology. For a discussion of the
implications of the various terms used for what we call 'cultural models' in this paper, see Keesing (1987).
128
Inferring cultural models from corpus data Globe, 1 (2015)
transmitted via interaction with other members of the same community.  Moreover,  due to their
taken-for-granted  nature,  cultural  models  typically  have  common  ground  status  within  the
community in question and are more or less conventionalized. Kronenfeld (2008: 71-72) elaborates
on this:
When we do anything with others, including talking (!), it is necessary to interrelate our
separate cognitive structures; and when we routinely do something with a variety of
others  we  will  tend  to  develop  some  standardized  way  of  doing  it  –  where
"standardized" refers to categories of actions, items, acceptable results, and so forth.
These shared action plans emerge as cultural models.
In a similar vein, D'Andrade (1987: 112) offers this definition: "A cultural model is a cognitive
schema that is intersubjectively shared by a social group", specifying that intersubjective sharing is
the knowledge that other people also know what you know (D'Andrade 1987: 113). We should
probably fine-tune the concept of intersubjective sharing such that it also covers the assumption or
presupposition (in addition to the knowledge) that other people also know what you know.
D'Andrade's (1987: 112) definition also specifies the schematic nature of cultural models. As
Rice (1980) reminds us, structures in cultural cognition are generally schematic. She points out that
"[a]  schema can be thought  of  as an abstracted pattern into or onto which information can be
organized", arguing that it "is best seen as being at the same time both structure and process" and
that  "different  schemata  encompass  various  scopes  and  can  be  applied  at  various  levels  of
abstraction" (Rice 1980: 153),2 and Kronenfeld (2008: 69) argues that they are abstract structures
that vary in degrees of specificity.
If  cultural  models  are  intersubjectively  shared  cognitive  structures  that  constitute
encyclopedic knowledge, how do they differ from what cognitive linguists call 'cognitive models',
and how do they relate to the universal aspects of human cognition? In some cases, it seems that
there is no difference. For instance, Lakoff (1987) often uses the term 'idealized cognitive model'
with reference to structures very similar to cultural models which applies to his discussions of the
concepts,  MOTHER (Lakoff 1987: 74-76, 80-82), and HOUSEWIFE (Lakoff 1987: 79-80), and he also
briefly  discusses  folk  models  (Lakoff  1987:  118).  In  Lakoff  & Kövesces'  (1987)  study of  the
conceptualization  of  ANGER in  American  English,  the  term 'cultural  model'  is  used  to  cover  a
cognitive phenomenon very similar to many of the phenomena called (idealized) cognitive models
in Lakoff (1987). In a rather consistent approach, Ungerer & Schmid (2006: 51) emphasize the
cultural specificity of such models:
Cognitive models are of course not universal but depend on the culture in which a
person grows up and lives. The culture provides the background for all the situations
that we have to experience in order to be able to form a cognitive model. A Russian or
German may not have formed a cognitive model of cricket simply because it is not part
of the culture of his own country to play that game. So, cognitive models for particular
domains ultimately depend on so-called  cultural models. In reverse, cultural models
can be seen as cognitive models that are shared by people belonging to a social group or
subgroup. (boldface in original)
However, Rice (1980: 154) points out that cultural models do involve more universal cognitive
2 Schema theory is, of course, widespread in the cognitive sciences and may be traced back to Gestalt psychology and
early educational psychology. Consequently, it should be no surprise that cultural models, as envisioned in cognitive
anthropology, are held to be schematic. See Rice (1980: 155) for a number of arguments for the application of
schema theory in cognitive anthropology and other cognitive sciences.
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phenomena:
On the continuum between the universal and the idiosyncratic lie the culturally derived
schemata. Like the idiosyncratic ones, they are experientially developed. But they have
in common with universal schemata a wider distribution.
It  is  these  cultural  schemata,  these  socially-given  perceptual  modes,  which
operate  to  produce  a  recognizable  "weltanschauung,"  or  worldview.  A theory which
views comprehension as  based on assimilation  to  mental  schemata  proceeds  on  the
assumption that the cognitive processes involved are universal ... It is certain kinds of
components of schemata which are culturally specific (Rice 1980: 154).
Cultural models are cognitive schemata in which universal cognitive processes and principles are
involved, but which – as wholes – are culturally specific and figure – as intersubjectively shared
structures  –  in  the  worldview  of  a  community  or  society.  As  regards  the  distinction  between
cognitive models and cultural models, the differentiation seems to be a matter of intra-theoretical
perspective and, ultimately, a quasi-artificial one:
Essentially, cognitive models and cultural models are just two sides of the same coin.
While the term 'cognitive model' stresses the psychological nature of these cognitive
entities and allows for inter-individual differences, the term 'cultural model' emphasizes
the uniting aspect of its being shared by many people. Although 'cognitive models' are
related to cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics while 'cultural models' belong to
sociolinguistics and anthropological linguistics, researchers in all of these fields should
be,  and usually are,  aware of both dimensions of their  object  of study.  (Ungerer  &
Schmid 2006: 52)
Thus, if a more ontological distinction is to be made, then it would simply be that cultural models
are cognitive models that have become conventionalized within a given culture. Such a distinction
would still allow both the psychological and social dimensions of such cognitive structures to be
taken into account.3
Drawing on the above discussion, we can set up the following general features of cultural
models:
• cultural models are schematic cognitive models, which involve universal cognitive structural
principles and processes
• cultural models are intersubjectively shared in a community and thus culturally specific
• cultural  models are  presumed by the members of the community to be intersubjectively
shared
• cultural models guide the community members' understanding of the world and people
• cultural models are behavior-mediating and behavior-regulating
3 As is apparent from the above, 'cultural' is often contrasted with 'universal'. Consequently, it may be tempting to
argue that a cultural model has to be exclusive to one community only to qualify as cultural, and that, if it does not
do that, then it is universal. However, this would grossly simplify matters, as the difference between 'cultural' and
'universal' is somewhat blurred. For instance, Communities A and B may share a cultural perception of phenomenon
X, but differ in their cultural perceptions of phenomenon Y. Community C, however, shares neither Community A
and B's cultural perception of phenomenon X nor their perception of phenomenon Y. Community A and Community
B's cultural perception of phenomenon X is not universal, because C does not share it. But it would be incorrect to
state that A and B's perception is not cultural.
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For the sake of illustration, here are some examples of various types of studies in cognitive
anthropology and cognitive linguistics of cultural models. The cultural models addressed are quite
different from the force-dynamic cultural models discussed in this paper, and they also differ quite
considerably from one another. This shows just how ubiquitous cultural models are, and that they
can be found in all layers of cultural and social cognition. One study deals with cultural models of
EDUCATION, covering elements such as the  PURPOSE OF EDUCATION,  TEACHER-STUDENT RELATIONSHIP,
and  ideas  of  the  SELF in  educational  contexts  (Fryberg  & Markus  2007:  216-220).  Fryberg  &
Markus  address  cultural  models  of  EDUCATION among  Native  American,  Asian  American,  and
European American students and how they differ in terms of the three above-mentioned elements. A
quite different pair of phenomena is cultural models of BREAKFAST in French and British cultures, as
discussed by Ungerer & Schmid (2006: 52-53). Ungerer & Schmid address  BREAKFAST within the
domain of  STAYING AT A HOTEL in  France and Britain respectively.  PETIT DÉJEUNER and  ENGLISH
BREAKFAST differ in terms of components, the former only consisting of  COFFEE and a  CROISSANT,
while the latter consists of a considerably larger number of components. The former is  SERVED at
BEDSIDE or taken at a  CAFE and is not included in the  ROOM RATE, while the latter is served in the
hotel's  BREAKFAST ROOM and  is  included  in  the  ROOM RATE.  While  these  cultural  models  are
considerably complex, there are of course also simple cultural models, as exemplified by Ungerer &
Schmid's (2006: 53-54) discussion of the differences between prototypical  DESKS in Europe and
Asia which are historically dependent on different traditional body postures assumed when writing,
with Europeans typically sitting on chairs and Asians typically sitting on the floor. Another study
reported in Ungerer & Schmid (2006: 54-55) addresses prototypicality of food lexemes in Nigerian
English and American English and finds that speakers of the two varieties of English rank  FOOD
types  quite  differently.  For  instance,  the  three  highest  ranking  items  in  the  FOOD category  in
Nigerian  English are  beans,  rice,  and  yam,  while  the  three  highest  ranking items  in  American
English are  chicken,  fish,  and  bread.  Moreover,  speakers of Nigerian English list  items such as
millet,  groundnut, and  maize as  FOOD lexemes, which do not figure in the rankings by American
English speakers. This is indicative of somewhat different underlying cultural models of FOOD and
categorizations  of  what  counts  a  typical  FOOD items  in  Nigerian  and  American  cultures.  Other
examples  of  cultural  models  are  the  American folk model  of  how the  MIND works  (D'Andrade
1987), American gender stereotypes (Holland & Skinner 1987), the American cultural model of
MARRIAGE (Quinn 1987),  the  American  cultural  model  of  LYING (Sweetser  1987),  metaphors  of
morality  (Bergen  2004:  31-33),  and  a  cultural  model  of  BUYER PASSIVITY and  EXPLOITATION in
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION (Gries & Stefanowitsch 2004: 232-233).
2.1. Force-dynamic cultural models and the reflection of cultural models in behavior
Given that cultural models are behavior-mediating, they are also reflected behavior. I will illustrate
this  using  a  rather  simple  model  of  causal  superstition.  What  characterizes  models  of  causal
superstition is a core relation of CAUSALITY, drawing on various image schemata of force-dynamics
(Johnson 1987: 42-48; see also Talmy 2000: 409-470), such that,  IF SITUATION P  HAPPENS,  THEN
SITUATION Q INVARIABLY FOLLOWS. There is, of course, no objective or natural relation between the
two situations, which is what makes such models superstitions, but they are more or less integral to
the way that people in the community in question understand and interact with the world. As an
example of one such model, allow me to use, in a rather informal and near-anecdotal fashion, a
model  which  occurs  in  many  European  cultures  –  namely,  the  BLACK CAT BRINGS BAD LUCK
superstition. In Danish culture, there is a variant of this superstition in which A BLACK CAT CROSSING
ONE'S PATH MEANS BAD LUCK.  This  model  draws on  CAUSATION based on the  COMPULSION image
schema (Johnson 1987: 45), in which a force input causes an entity into motion or some other state
of being non-static, such as the change from being NON-EXISTENT into being EXISTENT. Thus, there is
a relation of COMPULSION between the situation of A BLACK CAT CROSSING ONE'S PATH and BAD LUCK in
131
Globe, 1 (2015) Ebensgaard Jensen
the sense that the former causes the latter to invariably follow. As an owner of a black cat myself, I
have observed patterns in people's  interaction with our cat,  and children in particular displayed
behavioral patterns reflective of this superstition, ranging from attempts at chasing away our cat or
otherwise preventing it from crossing their path over running away from the cat to even cowering in
fear  at  the cat.  Some would also engage in  a  ritual  which is  supposed to  annul  the  BAD LUCK
generated by a  BLACK CAT – namely, spitting across one's left shoulder. This ritual draws on the
image schema of COUNTER-FORCE (Johnson 1987: 46) and expands on the COMPULSION-based cultural
model.4 For further examples of the features of force dynamics, see Johnson (1987: 41-64); his
(Johnson 1987: 53-57) discussion of modality offers some particularly clear illustrations of force-
dynamic image schemata at  play in language (see also Talmy 2000: 440-452 for an alternative
approach to force-dynamics in modality).
Now, this example is of course of a rather anecdotal nature, and superstitions may be banal
and even silly. However, superstitions are arguably very ingrained in people's cultural subconscious,
as  it  were,  and  even  non-superstitious  people  may  find  themselves  regulating  their  behavior
according to the underlying cultural models.
Causal superstitions are instances of what is called force-dynamic cultural models (Jensen
2014c). A force-dynamic cultural model is a cultural model in which a force-dynamic image schema
plays a pivotal role. Force-dynamic cultural models are typical of, but by no means delimited to,
superstitions. In the present study, we will encounter a number of such models in more "rational"
contexts, and it may well be that force-dynamics is ubiquitous at a number of different levels in
humans' understanding of the world around and between them.
2.2. Cultural models and corpus data
Language corpora document actually occurring usage-events (Kemmer & Barlow 2000: ix), and,
thus, they are essentially collections of instances of verbal behavior, as defined in this paper. Since
corpora  capture  a  wide  variety  of  verbal  behaviors,  it  stands  to  reason  that  corpus  linguistics
provides both data and methodology that could be helpful in inferring and reconstructing cultural
models.
Indeed, several studies in corpus linguistics have showed that corpus data and methodology
can be used in revealing states-of-affairs in cultural space. For instance Leech & Fallon (1992) and
Elsness (2013) make use of corpus data to reveal large-scale divergences and convergences between
British and American English. Leech & Fallon (1992) base their study on the London-Oslo-Bergen
(LOB)  corpus  of  British  English  and  the  Brown corpus  of  American  English  both  of  which
document their respective varieties of English in 1961. Looking at a number of linguistic variables,
for instance, they found lexical divergence in various domains reflecting different ways of life and,
consequently, cultures. In the domain of sports, for instance, they found that lexemes like  cricket
and  rugby were prevalent  in  LOB,  while  baseball was  prevalent  in  the  Brown corpus.  A more
interesting find in this domain is perhaps that lexical terms pertaining to sports and physical activity
were generally more prevalent in the Brown corpus than in LOB, which Leech & Fallon (1992: 38)
take  as  an  indicator  that  "the  American  way of  life  has  a  more  dominant  interest  in  sporting
activities". In the domain of travel and transportation, Leech & Fallon (1992: 39) found that lexical
terms  pertaining  to  transportation,  like  aircraft,  car,  wagon as  well  as  mileage and  river,  were
significantly more frequent in the American corpus than in the British one, reflecting that, because
of  the  huge distances  to  be  covered  when traveling  in  the  USA,  the  domain  of  transportation
4 One could of course also make the argument that there is an inner  COMPULSION which, caused by this particular
superstition, drives people into chasing away the cat or engaging in the ritual. This does not necessarily mean that
COUNTER-FORCE is not in play. On the contrary, if an active force-dynamic entity needs COMPULSION, then a COUNTER-
FORCE also needs  COMPULSION.  This  is  perhaps captured better  in  Talmy's  (2000:  440-452)  AGONIST-ANTAGONIST
model.
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received more emphasis in American culture than British culture. Leech & Fallon (1992: 43) also
find that there is a preference for masculine terms such as  boy,  man, and the masculine personal
pronouns  in  the  Brown corpus,  while  gentleman is  more  prevalent  in  LOB.  In  contrast  to  the
masculine bias in the Brown corpus, terms relating to the domain of family are prevalent in LOB,
such as father, mother, and marriage. Leech and Fallon (1992: 43; 44-45) take this to suggest that
American culture in 1961 was characterized by masculinity as a cultural value while family was a
more important cultural concept in Britain. In his follow-up study, Elsness (2013) investigates many
of the same variables as Leech & Fallon (1992) in more recent British and American corpora and
finds evidence of ongoing cultural convergence between British and American cultures. In his study
of  Singaporean  English  and  Malian  English  collocations  in  a  newspaper  corpus,  Ooi  (2000)
unearths a number of cultural concepts specific to these two cultures and the context(s) in which
they exist. To illustrate, here are three of the collocations that Ooi identifies, accompanied by his
description of their cultural relevance and meanings:
• killer litter: "[T]he term reflects a concern with this social menace [items thrown out from
high  rising  buildings  –  KEJ],  in  a  high-rise,  high-density  living  society:  Singapore
comprises only about 500 sq. km. Thus, killer litter implies not only that the litter can be
killing, but the person who does the act is a killer". (Ooi 2000: 81)
• urine  detector:  "While  one  might  wonder  whether  this  term  has  anything  to  do  with
urinalysis, it actually refers to a sensor inside a lift which, when someone urinates inside it,
triggers an alarm and traps the offender in the elevator until the police arrive. Again, one can
contribute  the  prevalence  of  this  term in  Singapore  to  a  desire  for  more  effective  and
technological means for catching social offenders". (Ooi 2000: 81)
• normal stream: "It is part of Singapore's competitive educational 'streaming' process where
pupils are selected, on the basis of their school results, to go to the Gifted, Express, Normal
or Technical Streams. Thus, a pupil who gets into the 'Normal' Stream is actually less than
normal and is regarded as being merely average". (Ooi 2000: 83)
While Leech & Fallon (1992), Ooi (2000), and Elsness (2013) show that corpus data can be used in
the analysis of culture and its reflection in language, there are few studies in which corpora are used
as a method of inferring cultural models.5 One such study is Gries & Stefanowitsch (2004). Gries &
Stefanowitsch  (2004:  232-233),  in  analyzing  collostructional  patterns  in  the  [V  into V-ing]-
construction, find that verbs of trickery, coercion, and negative emotion tend to co-occur with verbs
of commercial transaction, which reflects an underlying cultural model in which BUYERS are PASSIVE
PARTICIPANTs and SELLERS are ACTIVE PARTICIPANTs.
Given  that  discourse  is  behavior  and  assuming  that  culture,  language,  and  cognition  are
closely  interrelated,  cognitive  anthropologists  often  use  verbal  behavior  as  their  primary  data,
inferring  cultural  models  from  linguistically  encoded  cultural  experiences.  Of  course,  relating
language to culture and cognition is by no means exclusive to cognitive linguistics and cognitive
anthropology,  as  culture  is  undeniably  a  central  feature  of  anthropological  linguistic  and
sociolinguistic theory; already in the 1920s, Malinowski (1989 [1923]) argued that, in order to truly
understand language, we must also understand cultural cognition.6 Thus, for instance, Holland &
Skinner (1987) infer and reconstruct the cultural model of MARRIAGE on the basis of an analysis of
an interview in which marriage is discussed, while one of the methods applied in Fryberg & Markus
(2007) is the use of an open-ended questionnaire in which their respondents verbally encode their
5 That said, Ooi's (2000) descriptions are not unlike Wolf & Polzenhagen's (2014: 147-154) descriptions of underlying
cultural models of lexemes and collocations in Nigerian English and Hong Kong English.
6 See Duranti (1998) for a comprehensive overview of theories of culture in the humanistic and social sciences.
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understanding of various aspects of the concept of EDUCATION. The studies reported in Ungerer &
Schmid (2006) are based on goodness-of-exemplar ranking tasks, and Sweetser's famous study of
the cultural model of LYING draws on introspection.
With the exception of introspection, methods such as questionnaires, interviews, and ranking
tasks as well as attribute listing or term listing and sorting tasks,7 are particularly useful in teasing
out  details  of  underlying  cultural  models.8 This  is  because  these  methods  construct  artificial
discourse situations which prime subjects and respondents into verbalizing the cultural models in
fairly controlled and noise-free settings. In contrast, corpus data document verbal behavior in more
naturalistic, and noisy, settings. One might argue that the fairly naturalistic and uncontrolled nature
of corpus data provides the analyst with a way of inferring cultural models from naturally occurring
language in which language and culture are in natural interplay. Thus, corpus data and methods
arguably constitute a potentially very valuable addition to the repertoire of methods available to the
empirically oriented cognitive anthropologist, cognitive psychologist, or cognitive linguist.
3. The [too ADJ to V]-construction
In  the  present  article,  [too ADJ  to V]  is  considered  a  construction,  as  defined  in  construction
grammar  (e.g.  Lakoff  1987:  462-587;  Fillmore  et  al.  1988;  Goldberg  1995,  2006;  Croft  2001;
Hilpert 2014); that is, it is a pairing of form and conventionalized meaning. The meaning plane of a
construction  encompasses  both  semantic  and  pragmatic  meaning  (Goldberg  1995:  7)  and  is
reflective of underlying cognitive structures and processes. The symbolic structure of a construction
is gestaltic, such that the lexical items that appear in a construction are assigned specific functions
based on the meaning of the construction. Thus, constructional semantics may be idiomatic and
typically displays some degree of independence of the lexemes that appear in the construction. In
earlier  incarnations  of  construction  grammar,  constructions  were  considered  to  be  invariably
idiomatic,  as  exemplified  by  Goldberg's  (1995:  4)  definition  in  which  constructions  are
biconditionally  defined  by idiomaticity;  in  Goldberg  (2006:  5),  idiomaticity,  while  still  a  very
typical feature of constructions, no longer figures as a defining feature, as constructions are now
defined  as  "LEARNED PAIRINGS OF FORM WITH SEMANTIC OR DISCOURSE FUNCTION"  [smallcaps  in
original]. Similarly, Croft (2005: 274), defines a construction as "an entrenched routine …that is
generally used in the speech community ... and involves a pairing of form and meaning". In the
constructionist  conception  of  language,  the  language  system is  a  radial  taxonomic  network  of
constructions and subconstructions, based on general principles of information storage in human
cognition, and an important tenet is that a lexicon-construction continuum is embraced in which
morphological, lexical, and syntactic constructions (and any other type of construction, as it were)
are all pairings of form and meaning and only differ in terms of internal complexity rather than
belonging to separate modules of language (Goldberg 1995: 7). This is captured by the construction
7 Schmid et al. (2007) use attribute listing tasks in their study of syncretic concepts in Nigerian English, and term
listing and sorting is used in Li et al.'s (2004) study of concepts of SHAME in Chinese culture. In an interesting study
of small talk at parties in Irish, English and American settings, Schneider (2014) shows that discourse construction
tasks can be useful in inferring cultural models of context-bound interaction.
8 My rejection of introspection as an empirical method of inferring cultural models may seem harsh, and maybe it is.
However,  there  are  a  range  of  problems  associated  with  language  descriptions  based  purely  on  the  analyst's
intuitions about the language in question (and the associated cultural and cognitive structures). One such problem is
the fact that the analysts' own intuitions about the language and culture in question – even if the analyst is a native
speaker of the language and a member of the community in question – are very unlikely to capture every single
aspect  of  the  language  and  culture  in  question,  thus  essentially  making  introspection-based  descriptions  mere
hypotheses that cannot count as explanations or descriptions as such until they have been empirically tested. This
does not mean that introspective data are not scientific: insofar as it is recognized that they are hypotheses, and if
they are formulated in such a way that it is clear that they are hypotheses that may later be tested against empirical
data, their scientific value is naturally substantial. For more on the problems of introspection in language studies, see
McEnery & Wilson (2001: 111).
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grammarian's motto: It's constructions all the way down (e.g. Goldberg 2006: 18). While a number
of different inheritance principles figure in different versions of construction grammar, the present
paper adopts the usage-based model of inheritance in which redundancy, context-specificity, and
item-specificity  alongside  generalizations  and  very  abstract  structures  are  embraced  (Goldberg
2006: 12-14).
Described  by  Jensen  (2014a,  2014b,  2014c;  see  also  Fortuin  2013,  2014)  within  the
framework  of  construction  grammar,  the  [too ADJ  to V]-construction  is  a  scalar  adjectival
construction  whose  semantics  revolves  around  an  implied  force-dynamic  relation  (Bergen  &
Binsted  2004)  between [too ADJ]  and [to V],  as  seen  in  (1)-(6).  The construction  is  formally
bipartite, consisting of [too ADJ] and a to-infinitive, such that the latter postmodifies the adjectival
head. Too in [too ADJ] is a booster type premodifier (Paradis 2000: 149) and construes a very high
degree on a  SCALE OF ADJNESS imposed upon the element in the ADJ-position; thus, the image
schema of SCALE (Johnson 1987: 122) is conventionally associated with the construction. This high
degree of ADJNESS serves as the causal element in the underlying force-dynamic relation and either
prevents the situation in the  to-infinitive from happening, via application of the  BLOCKAGE image
schema (Johnson 1987: 45-46), or enables it to happen, via application of the ENABLEMENT image-
schema (Johnson 1987: 47). The function of the  PREVENTION type has been described by Fortuin
(2013) as an EXCESS function, highlighting that the PREVENTION is triggered by the degree ADJNESS
exceeding a  maximum limit  of  appropriateness  for  the situation  expressed  by [to V].  The two
variants are illustrated below, with (7) being an example of the former, and (8) being an example of
the latter:
(7) I'm too depressed to see straight. (COCA 2011 FICT RedCedarRev)
(8) I am only too happy to provide what little help I can. (COCA 2011 FIC Bk:AliceIHaveBeen)
In the present study, we are only interested in the  PREVENTION type, and, so, we are focusing on
force-dynamic  cultural  models  in  which  the main force-dynamic  relation is  that  of  PREVENTION
based on the BLOCKAGE image schema. The reason why our focus is on the PREVENTION type is that,
as Jensen's (2014a: 745-746) findings suggest, the  PREVENTION type is significantly more frequent
than the ENABLEMENT type. Moreover, the  EXCESS function of the [too ADJ to V]-construction has
received some attention in the literature, and Fortuin (2013) has found evidence for the  EXCESS
function of the construction, which makes the construction particularly interesting in relation to its
potential interplay with cultural models that draw on the force-dynamics of BLOCKAGE. That is not to
say that the ENABLEMENT type is not potentially interesting in relation to cultural models – in fact,
the example in (8) could suggest that the  ENABLEMENT type may serve to indicate  WILLINGNESS TO
ASSIST OTHER PEOPLE which is, if not culturally relevant, then at least socially relevant. In this study,
however, we are particularly interested in learning if it  is possible to infer force-dynamic, from
corpus data, cultural models of BLOCKAGE as reflected in American English.
4. Data and method
For this study, we will  draw on data from the 464,020,256-word corpus  COCA (Davies 2014).
Consequently,  we are  dealing  with  American  cultural  models.  In  a  corpus-wide  search,  19,525
instances of the construction were found. Using Gries (2007), these were subjected to a co-varying
collexeme analysis (Gries & Stefanowitsch 2004; Stefanowitsch & Gries 2005), which is a corpus-
based collostructional analysis that measures the degree of coattraction between the lexemes in two
schematic  positions in  a  construction.  In the case of  the [too ADJ  to V]-construction,  we thus
measure the coattraction between ADJ- and V-elements. Covarying collexeme analysis is based on
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four input frequencies: the occurrence of the first lexeme in one position in the construction, the
occurrence of all other lexemes in the same slot, the occurrence of the second lexeme in the other
slot in the construction, and the occurrence of all other lexemes in the other slot of the construction.
These are inserted into a 2-by-2 cross-table like this:
Table 1: Covarying collexeme analysis (Stefanowitsch & Gries 2005)
Lexeme 2 in slot 2 Other lexemes in slot 2 Row totals
Lexeme 1 in slot 1 x a x+a
Other lexemes in slot 1 y b y+b
Column totals x+y a+b column totals + row totals
The total sum is also run through a Fisher Exact Test or a similar statistical test, yielding a p-value,
indicating strength of the coattraction of the two lexemes in the construction in question. The degree
of coattraction is referred to as collostruction strength (abbreviated 'Coll.strength' in tables in this
article).  As  Stefanowitsch  & Gries  (2005:  7)  point  out,  using  a  log-transformed  p-value  has  a
number of advantages:
First,  the p-value is  not  an intuitively very easy measure since the most  interesting
values  are  only  located  in  the  small  range  of  0.05  to  0  (and  many  linguists  are
unfamiliar with the scientific format employed for representing such small numbers).
Second, the p-value as such can only represent the strength of the relation, but not its
direction, i. e., whether an observed frequency is larger or smaller than the expected
one.  Third,  the  log-transformation  allows  the  researcher  to  correlate  collostruction
strength with frequencies using linear correlation coefficients …
As a result of these advantages, log-transformed  p-values allow for somewhat more fine-grained
distinctions between the most strongly coattracted items in a construction. Because of this, I have
applied  log-transformed  p-values  in  my  covarying  collexeme  analysis.  For  a  more  detailed
discussion of the mechanics of covarying collexeme analysis, see Stefanowitsch & Gries (2005: 9-
11).
Covarying collexeme analysis produces a ranked list of pairs of coattracted lexemes in the
construction, which based on collostruction strength: the higher the score, the stronger the relation
of coattraction.  In Table 2 on page 137, we see the fifty most strongly coattracted pairs  in the
construction (10,187 pairs were identified in all).9 In accordance with the principle of semantic
coherence, which states that, "since a word in any slot of a construction must be compatible with the
semantics provided by the construction for that slot, there should be an overall coherence among all
slots" (Stefanowitsch & Gries 2005: 11), we can assume that coattracted elements in the ADJ- and
V-positions stand in force-dynamic relations such that the property expressed by the adjective in a
pair has a logical influence on the scenario predicated by the verb, as in  numerous-count,  heavy-
carry,  dark-see,  hot-touch,  excited-sleep,  stupid-know,  and  excited-sleep,  in  which  the  ADJ-
elements have a logically preventive effect on the situations expressed by the V-elements. At an
abstract  schematic  level,  such  PREVENTION results  in  what  Talmy  (2000:  415)  calls  extended
causation of rest, which means that it causes the participants in the scenario of the infinitive clause
9 Cases where the primary verbs (be, have, do) appear in the V-position are excluded in this study. This is because the
markup of primary verbs in the corpus is not optimal, since no distinction is made between their auxiliary uses and
their lexical uses. This, of course, leaves out some potentially valuable data, but, with proper markup of the primary
verbs in the future, this study can easily be replicated and the primary verbs included.
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to not act and interact, thus essentially causing non-existence or non-happening of the scenario.
Table 2: Top 50 coattracted collexemes
Rank ADJ V Coll.strength Rank ADJ V Coll.strength
1 early tell 1528.38435698167 26 heavy carry 124.3755261225
2 big fail 1402.67780068168 27 early start 117.768042298989
3 early say 673.749651472347 28 bright look 117.390507556761
4 dark see 633.712280147262 29 early judge 115.433514626678
5 young remember 531.616708933419 30 quick dismiss 114.717496452921
6 good pass 472.135275027497 31 drunk drive 110.023133085789
7 young understand 382.367430930175 32 poor buy 109.593957847202
8 late save 347.581214895259 33 poor pay 107.296055875141
9 poor afford 298.953845988046 34 young die 104.082372063773
10 numerous mention 257.678226584586 35 nervous eat 101.74693979917
11 hot handle 252.439074720694 36 willing compromise 98.2819850184592
12 young know 236.34785774602 37 happy oblige 96.7323055289143
13 numerous list 196.972148943439 38 proud beg 94.4930655943287
14 numerous count 191.258628641587 39 good last 93.4881306758162
15 late stop 182.127970563589 40 late prevent 90.9142499207819
16 big fit 160.696104391523 41 early declare 89.3289490607868
17 long wait 157.281159244082 42 proud admit 89.3281331956656
18 late change 148.375173429508 43 busy hate 85.9966045271147
19 heavy lift 142.098947417316 44 stupid know 85.8915891668518
20 early predict 139.519518681335 45 early draw 85.8044242609496
21 embarrassed ask 136.584536119856 46 old play 84.8966595204195
22 hot touch 136.105562887376 47 large fit 84.6157631272607
23 shy ask 132.647426404279 48 busy notice 84.3978141577957
24 early determine 129.615268822683 49 excited sleep 83.1571745295513
25 complicated explain 125.320990839008 50 late start 82.4649826421847
We are interested in pairs with the force-dynamic relation of PREVENTION. In the following, we will
focus on three particular instantiations of the construction – namely, [too young to V], [too proud to
V], and [too macho to V]. The adjectives in these particular instantiations are likely to be tied in
with  semantic  concepts  that  are  intertwined  with  cultural  cognition,  which  is  why these  three
instantiations  are  particularly suitable  for  an exploratory study such as  the  one at  hand.  Young
relates to AGE, and we can expect different age ranges to be associated with, and dissociated from, a
variety of activities and behaviors that are considered appropriate, or inappropriate, for the specific
age ranges. In this case, of course, we focus on YOUNG AGE, relative though this concept is. Proud
and  macho are adjectives that express attributes derived from patterns of social behavior and are
thus likely to be tied in with stereotyped images of individuals that display such behaviors. Such
stereotypes are intersubjectively shared in the communities in which they exist, and the community
members use the stereotypes to make sense of those individuals' behaviors. With this in mind, we
can hypothesize that there may be patterns of attraction among the verbs that are coattracted to each
of these realizations of the ADJ-position, which, given the force-dynamics of PREVENTION found in
the  constructional  semantics,  may provide  us  with insights  into  culturally perceived behavioral
patterns captured by the cultural models associated with the attributes expressed by the adjectival
elements.
Concluding this section is a methodological disclaimer. Our focus is on American culture only
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as we are primarily interested in seeing whether corpus data and methodology are applicable in the
study of  cultural  models,  but  it  should be  mentioned that  a  contrastive  study which  takes  into
account uses of the [too ADJ to V]-construction is different varieties of English, or which compares
[too ADJ to V] to a similar construction in a different language, would enable us to more precisely
evaluate the culture-specificity of the underlying cognitive models in question. In the present paper,
we are primarily interested in seeing to which extent such models emerge from resulting findings of
a covarying collexeme analysis. Among the next 'natural steps' in a more fully fledged investigation
of the interaction between the construction and cultural models would be systematic contrastive
studies.
5. Cultural models of AGE
Our main assumption about [too young to V] is that the discursive behavior of this instantiation of
[too ADJ to V] as documented in COCA may reflect an underlying cultural model of AGE. The table
on page 139 provides a list of lexemes attracted to  young in the construction. Not surprisingly,
young occurs  with  drink,  drive,  and  vote,  reflecting  underlying  cultural  patterns  of  behavior
pertaining to  AGE, or rather restrictions thereon imposed by legislation which have arguably been
absorbed by the "weltanschauung", to use Rice's (1980: 154) diction, of American culture. All three
pairs reflect situations in which a  MINIMUM AGE is imposed upon the activity expressed by the V-
lexeme, and too young construes a degree of YOUNGNESS that exceeds the MINIMUM AGE specified by
the legal restrictions in question, thus preventing the activity from taking place.
Below is an illustrative example of each pair:
(9) He was old enough to vote and kill and die, which made him a man. He was too young to
drink, even beer, which made him a boy. (COCA 2008 FIC Bk:NothingLose)
(10) Lance Colton couldn't be more proud of the battered 68 Camaro that he is still too young to
drive. Restoring it was a dream he shared with his dad, that kept the two tinkering in the
garage from morning until night. (COCA 2004 SPOK CBS_Rather)
(11) He's too young to vote, let alone run for office. But David Baker, 17, has already served two
terms in Congress in Washington, D.C. – as a page for the House of Representatives and the
Senate. (COCA 2000 MAG BoysLife)
Note that (11) specifies a degree of YOUNGNESS that is so high that voting is prevented, in that  17
occurs as a specification of David Baker's age. Age specifications form another discursive element
that could be investigated  in conjunction with young-pairs in the [too ADJ to V]-construction, and a
more  detailed  qualitative  analysis  of  the  expanded  co-text10 with  a  view  to  identifying  age
specifications and maybe even operationalizing them would be likely to produce valuable insights
into cultural models of AGE. I will not follow up on this in the present article, as it would amount to
an investigation far beyond the scope of the article.
While  there are  several  indicators  of various  cultural  perceptions  pertaining to  AGE,  what
strikes me is that young seems to attract verbs of COGNITION (we include verbs of EVALUATION in this
category),  such as  know,  remember,  understand,  recall,  appreciate,  realize,  comprehend,  learn,
recollect,  question,  grasp,  evaluate,  process, and recognize. This seems to suggest that there is an
underlying perception of AGE and INTELLECT in American culture in which YOUNG AGE has a negative
impact on INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY. 
10 Co-text is defined by Catford (1965: 31fn2) as "items in the text which accompany the item under discussion".
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Table 3: V-lexemes coattracted to young
Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength
5 remember 531.6167089334 6400 smell 3.3780512831 8226 handle 1.076894277
7 understand 382.3674309302 6401 visualize 3.3780512831 8229 notice 1.0736879882
12 know 236.347857746 6467 question 3.2651856734 8330 serve 0.944795401
34 die 104.0823720638 6551 enter 3.1738895519 8333 hear 0.9415811643
91 vote 49.9399053694 6627 grasp 3.0536859828 8357 choose 0.9063051699
127 recall 38.8795405744 6733 obtain 2.8912259292 8358 earn 0.9063051699
192 retire 29.9369724328 7031 decide 2.5675918774 8365 control 0.8900141523
251 appreciate 23.4409880659 7032 settle 2.5675918774 8549 apologize 0.7190854436
268 drive 22.6840945836 7068 enjoy 2.5628742408 8578 play 0.6887799849
339 realize 20.5029210874 7150 boast 2.4310032725 8655 follow 0.5827118171
350 enlist 19.9882055431 7151 converse 2.4310032725 8675 benefit 0.5679099221
434 hate 18.7786295508 7152 plead 2.4310032725 8676 sign 0.5679099221
445 consent 18.1596215648 7153 preach 2.4310032725 8677 study 0.5679099221
505 drink 17.6524544154 7154 ruin 2.4310032725 8707 walk 0.5404874164
538 get 17.1345523011 7155 secure 2.4310032725 8778 worry 0.4668891661
1464 feel 12.0131239135 7156 smoke 2.4310032725 8793 bury 0.4447130294
1584 comprehend 11.6175325598 7277 evaluate 2.2845753382 8794 indulge 0.4447130294
2036 marry 10.2936192564 7574 exhibit 1.8508606252 8795 quit 0.4447130294
2065 learn 10.2346036097 7575 hike 1.8508606252 8911 engage 0.3438684324
2528 fight 9.3820419832 7576 resent 1.8508606252 9061 consider 0.2175255239
2969 socialize 8.3846589982 7613 dance 1.8135782788 9077 commit 0.1939347117
3097 shave 8.0708526927 7614 receive 1.8135782788 9078 lose 0.19211283
3858 participate 6.9558086716 7615 rule 1.8135782788 9079 win 0.19211283
3974 dial 6.7579123918 7862 go 1.5115509712 9085 travel 0.1865073433
3975 rent 6.7579123918 7913 deserve 1.4449762703 9115 write 0.1582728209
4397 own 6.06271523 7914 like 1.4449762703 9147 begin 0.132706061
4407 baby-sit 6.0511969511 7915 pin 1.4449762703 9212 set 0.095974358
4408 dominate 6.0511969511 7916 process 1.4449762703 9266 claim 0.062058303
4409 lean 6.0511969511 7917 row 1.4449762703 9282 recognize 0.0531247572
4410 meddle 6.0511969511 7918 shape 1.4449762703 9314 listen 0.0366551811
4411 mind 6.0511969511 7919 shoulder 1.4449762703 9315 apply 0.0364982453
4412 re-create 6.0511969511 7920 smile 1.4449762703 9316 dig 0.0364982453
4413 recollect 6.0511969511 7921 wield 1.4449762703 9368 run 0.0185509689
4781 qualify 5.452383851 7926 absorb 1.4390017639 9401 use 0.0097772519
5112 join 5.0493701814 7927 visit 1.4390017639 9420 account 0.0066735003
5259 reproduce 4.8636271275 8027 work 1.3135004073 9421 cross 0.0066735003
6058 care 3.8036674188 8041 read 1.304006599 9422 shoot 0.0066735003
6131 testify 3.7031630195 8088 attend 1.2281816852 9423 compete 0.0061908425
6397 contend 3.3780512831 8160 chew 1.1417299471 9456 need 0.0008988344
6398 separate 3.3780512831 8161 haul 1.1417299471 9466 leave 0.0004815191
6399 shine 3.3780512831 8182 face 1.1273804603
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Consider the following examples of the [too young to VCOGNITIVE]-instantiation of the construction:
(12) a. At her feet, her 6-year-old daughter, Janelle, and 4-year-old son, James, chased each other
in a game of tag. Alexis gazed fondly at them. They are still  too young to know exactly
what Mommy did for a living, she said – and she wants to keep it that way. (COCA 2011
MAG SanFranChron)
b. Asked why the youths had been acquitted of attempted murder despite the jogger's near
fatal injuries on the night of April 19, 1989, one juror, Charles Nestorick, said: "it was a
very, very painful decision." "It was very dark in the park and we believed that they didn't
realize how much damage they were doing," he said. "They were  too young to know."
Another juror,  Rafael  Mirandez,  said,  "They had knives and didn't  use them." A third,
Ronald Gold,  said  he had resisted convicting Mr.  McCray of  rape  until  yesterday.  He
changed his mind, he said, after watching the youth's videotaped confession played one
last time.  (COCA 1990 NEWS NYTimes)
c. At 14, Jamie Fleming should be too young to know about guns or any of the specific details
of violence and perversity that fill  his mind – and, he says, his memory. (COCA 1993
SPOK CBS_EyeToEye)
(13) a. The hardest part of the process for Leake was the resistance she faced from a 3-year-old
and a 5-year-old  who were  too young to  understand why Froot  Loops were suddenly
forbidden (COCA 2011 MAG Prevention)
b. "My compliments to the host," I said, hoping she wasn't too young to understand irony.But
she shoved the bottle back to me, her mask swiveling to the left. "I can't take that,"she said,
her voice carrying more than a trace of alarm. "Someone might think you're trying to bribe
me." (COCA 2005 FIC Analog)
c. "They  can  do  things  as  a  team  sometimes,  but  sometimes  they  can't.  I  am  very,
verydisappointed in them. Know how many games I've lost when I've had a double-digit
lead like that one." "Three," is the guess. "Two," he declares. "Just two. I was 49-1 until
Sunday. And lemme' tell you something else: I'm getting too old to lose. These guys I got
here, a lot of 'em are too young to understand what I mean. All I want to do is get my team
to perform up to how I think they're capable of performing. I don't care what anyone else
thinks. OK? It's what I think." (COCA 1998 NEWS Chicago)
(14) a. Of course the juvenile justice system does occasionally deal with children  too young to
appreciate the moral dimensions or real-world consequences of their behavior... (COCA
1998 ACAD CATOJournal)
b. "I don't think children are  too young to appreciate what that sunken ship represents," he
told me. (COCA 1991 MAG Smithsonian)
(15) a. AT FIFTEEN,  BILL JOHNSON  was  really  too young to comprehend the  danger  of
frostbite. (COCA 1997 MAG FieldStream)
b. At ten, I was much too young to comprehend the significance of anything my grandfather
said, but I liked to hear him talk. (COCA 1994 FIC AfricanAmericanReview)
(16) Everything happens for God’s good reason is the cliché my mother has drilled in my head
since I was old enough to ask "Why?" – too young to question why she really didn’t seem to
believe this was true regarding her and my father. (COCA 2010 FIC Bk:PowderNecklace)
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(17) And he wasn't lying when he said he wasn't afraid, even for a thousandth of a second, that his
father wouldn't hit the apple. It was later on, when he grew up, that he began to think back
and ask the questions his son now asked him. At the time of the heroic deed he was too young
to grasp the real danger implicit in that challenge, but his father was no child. How could he
have imperiled his son's life without shaking at all? (COCA 2011 FIC MassachRev)
(18) He gave  Marcado peppermints,  rubber  balls,  and dolls  with  eyelashes,  his  dark  sad  eyes
searching her face in a way she was too young to evaluate, while Elsine colored black hearts
and sucked on stones. (COCA 2003 FIC FantasySciFi)
The examples above show that the force-dynamic relation of  YOUNG AGE BLOCKING INTELLECTUAL
CAPACITY is  applied  in  a  myriad  of  different  ways,  depending  on the  co-text  and the  concepts
activated in the current discourse space.11 Thus, the [too young to VCOGNITIVE]-instantiation of [too ADJ
to V] enters into mutually specificational relationships with other elements in the texts, such that
young is specified by the co-text (or by implicatures generated by the co-text), and a force-dynamic
relation of BLOCKAGE is set up between young and the proposition expressed by the infinitive clause.
Given that canonical discourse involves thematic coherence, we can assume that there is semantic
coherence throughout the entire stretch of discourse that relates to the instance of [too young to
VCOGNITIVE] in question, such that the surrounding discursive context draws on and, possibly, elaborates
on the cultural model associated with the construction,  as well as any other conceptual content
evoked throughout the discourse. For example, a formulation like *At 51, he was too young to
understand what his mother did for a living would be semantically odd, while  At 51, he was too
young to understand the problems that senior citizens face daily would be semantically acceptable.
Our analysis could be expanded by looking at coattraction patterns with other ADJ-lexemes.
We will restrict ourselves to the most obvious candidate – namely, old. Table 4 on page 142 lists the
fifty V-lexemes that are the most strongly coattracted to old in the construction. Several of the V-
lexemes on the list seem to reflect relations in which a high degree of OLDNESS blocks the situation
predicated by the V-lexeme. For instance  too old to enjoy indicates that there are degrees on the
scale of OLDNESS that prevent the described individual from enjoying certain situations. Of course,
exactly  what  type  of  situation  this  is  applied  to  is  specified  in  the  actual  usage-event.  In  the
instances of too old to enjoy found in COCA, the OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT ranges from money over a
bottle of wine to life itself. Likewise,  too old to hire and too old to work indicate a perception in
American culture that there is a maximum age limit for when a person is considered capable of
working and thus worthy of appointing or hiring. A final example is too old to cry which reflects a
cultural perception that there is a maximum age at which the act of crying is socially acceptable.
Below are illustrative examples:
(19) "I thought choosing Plan A was a little risky, but I also thought it might be better to get some
of the money in my younger years rather than when I'm too old to enjoy it," he said. (COCA
1998 NEW NYTimes)
(20) "I'm in a certain group that's almost too old to hire," says Dalke, who lives in a one bedroom
apartment in Golden. "Being over 50 in these times, it's hard to land something." (COCA
2011 NEWS Denver)
11 The current discourse space is defined by Langacker (2001: 144) as "the mental space comprising those elements
and relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for communication at a given moment in
the flow of discourse."
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(21) "I'll be 16 next spring," he pleaded. Dowd buttoned his sheepskin coat." It'd be best if you
stayed here. Just in case word comes in." The walls closed around him like an avalanche. He
felt  too old to cry, but angry tears glazed his eyes. "That's my dad out there." No one said
anything. (COCA 1990 MAG BoysLife)
Note that, as seen in (19)-(21), the degree of OLDNESS that triggers BLOCKAGE of the scenario differs
depending on the scenario itself. In (20), we see that the AGE that prevents hireability is fifty, while
the AGE that prevents crying, or at least makes it socially undesired, is fifteen or higher.
Table 4: Top 50 V-lexemes coattracted to old
Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength
83 learn 54.4171989490659 3727 pat 7.16647484447686
152 work 34.6534315861253 3728 patrol 7.16647484447686
236 run 25.1595935753305 3729 practise 7.16647484447686
382 want 18.9923466719583 3730 quarrel 7.16647484447686
443 cry 18.4236796760803 3731 reheat 7.16647484447686
494 chase 17.8211178388252 3732 remarry 7.16647484447686
547 become 16.7732421331107 3733 revert 7.16647484447686
664 go 15.9798067870398 3734 slay 7.16647484447686
908 race 14.3365372899232 3735 transplant 7.16647484447686
909 rock 14.3365372899232 3736 trick 7.16647484447686
1418 adopt 12.1739109892923 4021 drive 6.69520919004453
1916 stoop 10.5736579320413 4074 lose 6.58395010465351
1973 benefit 10.3896020702044 4115 climb 6.53481326097242
2493 fall 9.44295759619808 4136 take 6.51548488914309
2495 start 9.44006949106636 4788 continue 5.43717494832891
2673 enjoy 9.09557076431138 4891 keep 5.28105683435573
2742 duck 8.90377406922286 5326 obtain 4.77821581144005
2767 hunt 8.83378139126597 5550 bounce 4.45019421739204
3035 fly 8.2423876884787 5551 braid 4.45019421739204
3121 hire 8.02604968392528 5552 cash 4.45019421739204
3526 change 7.36852114048533 5553 cheat 4.45019421739204
3584 qualify 7.27654857564505 5554 cuddle 4.45019421739204
3724 envy 7.16647484447686 5555 diss 4.45019421739204
3725 insert 7.16647484447686 5556 foster 4.45019421739204
3726 journey 7.16647484447686 5557 leap 4.45019421739204
From this covarying collexeme analysis emerges a complex cultural model of  AGE, or perhaps a
complex network of cultural models of AGE, in which AGE is a scale, and along that scale are points
which serve as limits of possibility of situations such that degrees of AGE beyond this point result in
BLOCKAGE of the situation in question from occurring. We even see how speakers, participants, and
characters draw on the model to make sense of other people's behavior and in decision-making,
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using the [too ADJ to V]-construction in their verbal argumentations.
Granted, this model, or network of models, has only been partially inferred from our corpus-
study,  but I  would argue that  a more detailed study would result  in  a deeper  understanding of
cultural  models  of  AGE and  force-dynamics,  and,  combined  with  methods  used  in  cognitive
anthropology, such a corpus-study would provide us with invaluable insights into the perception of
AGE and the constraints it is held to impose upon people within American culture.
6. Models of PRIDE
PRIDE is typically considered an individual character trait and a hubristic emotion (Cheng et al.
2010),12 but it  is arguably tied in with socio-cultural  values. It  is essentially a positive emotion
applied in, or perhaps resulting from, the evaluation of achievements or attributes; for instance, a
university student might be proud having finished his or her first year at university or a hand model
might be proud of her healthy-looking nails. Thus, PRIDE is a psychological phenomenon. However,
as with SHAME (Li et al. 2004), the acts and features that make one feel proud are often associated
with  social  value and socially perceived as  positive  assets  or  indicators  of  a  strong or  healthy
character,  while  acts  and  features  that  are  not  socially  desirable  are  considered  indicative  of
weakness in character. In other words,  PRIDE is also associated with perceptions of social status
(Cheng et al.  2010), which is arguably a cultural phenomenon, since what ensures social  status
depends on the worldview of the community in question. Loss of social status is arguably intimately
related to loss of face, as defined by Goffman (1967). Three integral aspects of a cultural model of
PRIDE should thus be situations that enable one to gain face, situations that cause one to lose face,
and the 'instinct' to avoid situations the cause one to lose face. In other words, a high degree of
PRIDE may prevent one doing things that are threatening to one's own face.
Given the force-dynamic semantics of [too ADJ to V], we can assume that instances of the
construction in which proud figures as the ADJ-element may provide us with insight into the actions
and states considered incompatible with PRIDE in American culture. In Table 5 on 144 is a list of the
V-lexemes coattracted to pride in the construction.
Lexemes such as beg, admit, ask, apologize, flee, wince, and plead are among the coattracted
V-lexemes. This suggests that among the situations they conventionally predicate we find situations
that are incompatible with a high degree of PRIDE and thus likely to be face-threatening. Below are
illustrative examples of each of these verbs in the V-position:
(22) She spoke almost politely, as if she didn't want to intrude, but she repeated the same phrases
over and over, too proud to beg but desperate to be heard: "I'm cold. Can someone bring me a
blanket? This room is so cold." (COCA 2002 FIC Bk:LivingBlood)
(23) And so we go about our business much too proud to admit defeat and much too blunt to gain
victory. (COCA 1999 SPOK NPR_TalkNation)
(24) Steve Peck, too proud to ask for help. (COCA 2011 SPOK NPR_TalkNat)
(25) "If I'm ready to talk after a fight, but too proud to apologize, I make my Reconciliation Soup.
When he smells that cooking, he knows I'm sorry," she says. (COCA 1998 NEWS WashPost)
(26) They came forward, swinging their clubs, and Bearwald gripped his sword, too proud to flee.
(COCA 1992 FIC BkSF:WhenFiveMoons)
12 For an overview of pride studies, see Sullivan (2007).
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Table 5: V-lexemes coattracted to proud
Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength
38 beg 94.4930655943287 5974 condemn 3.90114325274183
42 admit 89.3281331956656 5975 screw 3.90114325274183
100 ask 45.8731009181586 6175 apologize 3.63142890651582
109 accept 43.0472366638223 6176 bend 3.63142890651582
181 take 30.83078647397 6177 recount 3.63142890651582
197 whitewash 28.6588646057626 6178 steal 3.63142890651582
341 acknowledge 20.4413934448906 6529 flee 3.19205419572279
378 befriend 19.0938416182487 6647 engage 3.00870192115055
725 resign 15.2916287025719 6648 pretend 3.00870192115055
776 let 15.1228397154788 7073 express 2.55672656977846
2445 ape 9.54091138496496 7157 set 2.43073359696925
2446 bow 9.54091138496496 7229 show 2.34177390726771
2447 consort 9.54091138496496 7320 approach 2.20619422933044
2448 fancy 9.54091138496496 7577 learn 1.84748148164786
2449 humble 9.54091138496496 7988 bring 1.37126883977579
2450 nuzzle 9.54091138496496 8224 pick 1.07851603413856
2451 request 9.54091138496496 8281 listen 0.996541062881942
2452 respect 9.54091138496496 8282 ride 0.996541062881942
2453 truckle 9.54091138496496 8374 permit 0.885298154974608
3956 fight 6.79859610097965 8375 return 0.885298154974608
3963 copy 6.78529720010197 8485 cry 0.786245922911548
3964 recruit 6.78529720010197 8606 consider 0.64377913404494
3965 rehearse 6.78529720010197 8796 respond 0.443070996840437
3966 wince 6.78529720010197 8938 wait 0.324675522890184
4590 plead 5.75577632312191 9084 try 0.187797562757215
4591 stoop 5.75577632312191 9157 call 0.125139537308178
4906 say 5.25433703914281 9269 carry 0.0614379226094846
5076 borrow 5.0931564597768 9366 go 0.0193615199681514
5077 demand 5.0931564597768 9380 turn 0.0147560853080088
5436 remind 4.60479053854155 9446 allow 0.00160800022097272
5746 obey 4.219058298182 9447 notice 0.00160800022097272
5747 thank 4.219058298182 9484 come 2.83369132891079e-05
5862 share 4.03118859742546
(27) For such a self-confident, strong man, Mama says, our Papa's feelings are hurt easily, though
he is too proud to wince, he only squints. (COCA 1990 FIC Bk:StainlessSteel)
(28) She has the eyes of an orphan  too proud to plead, too desperate to reproach. (COCA 2004
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MAG TIME)
In all examples, (27) perhaps being less obvious due to its metaphorical nature, the infinitive clause
expresses a situation in which the primary participant loses face. In particular, we are dealing with
activities that might be considered reflective of weakness, such as begging, asking for help, fleeing
from danger, and metaphorically wincing in the face of emotional pain. Seeing that loss of face also
results in loss of social status to various extents, it makes sense that a high degree of PRIDE should
BLOCK acts that compromise one's face.
Of course,  we should  remind ourselves  that  the semantics  of  both  lexemes  and syntactic
structures  is  dependent  on  the  discursive  contexts  in  which  they appear,  and that  interlocutors
construe them online in discourse. For instance, what makes the situation of asking considerably
face-threatening in (24) is the discursive context for help. However, in a usage-based perspective,
contextual patterns are stored with linguistic units, and the fact that ask is coattracted to proud in the
construction  could  suggest  that  one  conventional  sense  of  the  verb  does  include  concepts  of
potential loss of face.
Interestingly, thank also appears to be coattracted to proud, which seems odd since thanking
ought to be a socially desirable act. Let us have a closer look at that. In fact, there is only one
example of thank appearing with proud in [too ADJ to V]:
(29) "It's the date of FDR's death," he said, "and it's a date we think every American should know.
The audience will want you to hit it right on the head – no thirty-day leeway. Listen, you do
well, there's no reason you couldn't win second-prize money, O.K.? See you back here no
later than quarter to eight." I was not too proud to thank him, and as I left for the back-issue
store, I thought over what I'd been told. (COCA 1995 MAG AmHeritage)
It is not inconceivable that there are situations where thanking can be face-threatening, in particular
if what is being thanked for is in itself face-threatening.13 This may be the case of the interaction
recounted by the narrator in (29) prior to the occurrence of too proud to thank (note also that too
proud to thank is negated),14 in which the other interlocutor seems to be in a more powerful position
than the narrator.
In our discussion of coattracted lexemes of proud in [too ADJ  to V], we have been able to
infer inklings of what seems to be the underlying understanding of both the concept of  PRIDE in
American culture as well as an idea of what constitutes face-threatening situations incompatible
with PRIDE. As with [too young to V], the cultural model of PRIDE appears to be a somewhat complex
network of models, and a more detailed corpus-study of verbal behavior pertaining to the concept of
PRIDE would probably grant us a more detailed picture.
7. Models of MACHISMO
MACHISMO is, to some extent, related to PRIDE, as it may be defined as extreme masculinity reflected
in patterns of behavior and strong male pride. Although often associated with Latino culture (e.g.
13 Indeed, Eisenstein & Bodman (1986) categorize expressions of gratitude as face-threatening acts.
14 There were no examples in the corpus in which  too proud to thank was not negated. However,  for illustrative
purposes, here is an example from an online top 10 list of gifts for men, which quite clearly draws on a model of
male pride:
Garmin nüvi 1450LMT 5-Inch Portable GPS Navigator with Lifetime Map & Traffic Updates. If your guy is the
type that never likes to ask for directions, save him the embarrassment and get him one of these. He might be too
proud to thank you for it but he will appreciate you for it on the inside.
(source: http://www.craftyshopper.com/top-10-best-gifts-for-men/)
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Anders 1993), the concept does exist in Anglophone cultures, which is reflected by the adoption of
the word macho into the English language.
The purpose of this case study is a bit different from the two previous ones. In the previous
studies,  there  were  numerous  instances  of  young and  proud in  the  construction,  and  we  saw
indications of patterned ranges of coattracted verbs. Our corpus-wide study of [too ADJ to V] in
COCA shows that, although not common (it does not even appear in Table 2), macho does appear in
the construction. This would suggest that there is a cultural conception of what constitutes macho
behavior in American culture. Although the number of instances of macho in the construction is not
particularly high, they can still provide some insight into the cultural perception of force-dynamic
aspects  of  MACHISMO.  In  this  particular  case  study,  then,  we  will  explore  the  applicability  of
covarying collexeme analysis in cases of scarcity of data. While there are only few instances, the
statistics of the method are powerful enough to provide us with a material for hypotheses that may
be tested against larger data sets.
Below is a list of V-lexemes coattracted to macho in COCA:
Table 6: V-lexemes coattracted to macho
Rank V-lexeme Coll.strength
2399 ask 9.65380669906567
3238 back 7.76968391833239
4231 listen 6.36958801790785
4399 cry 6.06217644204677
4777 wear 5.4573854448748
5935 let 3.94853481675146
7618 see 1.80919245237497
7737 get 1.67625940042516
Perhaps not surprisingly,  cry and  ask appear on the list – both lexemes were also associated with
proud in the construction – and a look at the co-text of the instances in which these verbs co-occur
with macho in the construction suggest that prevention of loss of face and social status is associated
with MACHISMO:
(30) He wasn't saying anything, and he's too macho to cry in public, but I knew him. (COCA 2009
FIC Bk:MuchoMojoHapLeonard)
(31) a. Andrew also knows the VA, when properly equipped, can really make a difference with
PTSD. And now that he's recovering, he's trying to spread the word that you can never be
too macho to ask for help. (COCA 2007 SPOK CBS_Early)
b. lf you hadn't been too macho to ask for directions, we wouldn't have missed the wedding!
(COCA 1998 MAG Cosmopolitan)
In (30), the high degree of  MACHISMO expressed in the utterance is construed as preventing the
situation of the person described as macho crying in public. Crying in public is an act that reveals
vulnerability and can potentially threaten one's face severely. In particular, if crying is considered a
typically feminine or unmanly activity (e.g. Vogel et al. 2011: 368-369), it is obviously at odds with
perceived masculine values and macho behavior. The two examples in (31) are similar to (24) in the
sense that  asking for  help may be seen as a  sign of  weakness and inability to  solve problems
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oneself,  which is  at  odds with both  PRIDE and  MACHISMO.  The utterance in (31a) is  particularly
interesting because  too macho to ask for help is negated, and it is set against the background of
military culture, which is arguably a hyper masculine one, which may be at odds with the highly
emotional vulnerability of veterans who suffer from PTSD. Indeed, the corpus data do indicate that
emotionality is at odds with MACHISMO:
(32) The college kids fall into two camps: those who worry about skin cancer, and those who are
too macho to let on, even if they do. (COCA  2009 FIC Analog)
(33) "Your woman has probably been trying to tell you for 10 years how to be a better father or
husband, but you've been too macho to listen," says Real. (COCA 2003 MAG Prevention)
In these two examples,  high degrees of  MACHISMO are  construed as preventive of admission of
health worries (32) and of marital communication. In (35) below, housework is considered to be
incompatible with MACHISMO, probably because housework is traditionally associated with women:
(34) You see, that's because I'm not  too macho to get down and dirty, and I help out with the
housework. (COCA 1993 SPOK Ind_Geraldo)
Finally, in the following examples, MACHISMO is associated with unreasonable stubbornness:
(35) A popular inference is that Armstrong might have been able to head this off if he wasn't too
bullheaded, too macho to see a doctor. (COCA 1997 MAG Bicycling)
(36) Or maybe a "nut," she says, who loves the coat but doesn't understand its value, and a "nut
boyfriend" who is too macho to back out of buying it when he learns the price. (COCA 2000
MAG Bazaar)
Due to the scarcity of instances of macho in [too ADJ to V] in COCA, we can obviously not make
any general conclusions about a cultural model of  MACHISMO (which was not the purpose in this
particular case). However, I would argue that the examples listed above do reveal a number of
aspects which may serve as elements  in  an empirically based hypothesis  about  MACHISMO as  a
cultural model. Firstly, the examples suggest – not surprisingly – that a high degree of MACHISMO is
at odds with emotionality, vulnerability, face-compromising situations, and traditionally feminine
chores.  Secondly,  they  indicate  that  MACHISMO is  generally  considered  a  negative  type  of
masculinity in American culture and associated with unreasonable and non-constructive behavior,
which is particularly prevalent in examples (31a), (32)-(33), and (35)-(36). These aspects could be
operationalized and thus tested against various types of data in a large scale analysis.
6. Concluding remarks
Cultural  models  are  intersubjectively shared cognitive models  in  a  community.  They guide the
members'  understanding of the world and are reflected in their behavior. Consequently,  cultural
models may also be inferred and reconstructed via observation of the behavior of the members of
the  community  in  question.  Cognitive  anthropologists  and  other  cognitive  scientists,  such  as
cognitive linguists and cognitive psychologists with an interest in culture, have thus developed a
number of methods to aid them in inferring cultural models from verbal behavior. Most of these set
up focused and controlled noise-free environments in which verbal behavior-priming experiments
are conducted. Among such methods are focused interviews, questionnaires, and different ranking,
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listing, and sorting tasks. These are, understood broadly, essentially laboratory settings in which
artificial  verbal  behavior  is  triggered.  Such  experiments  are  extremely  useful  in  identifying
underlying cultural models (and other cognitive models), and one of their main advantages is that
they produce only a very small  amount of data noise,  if  any. However,  they do not enable the
analyst  to  observe  the  interaction  between  verbal  behavior  and  cultural  models  in  naturally
occurring discourse. At the end of the day, natural discourse is the natural setting, so to speak, of
this interplay, and ignoring it is likely to result in interesting and potentially important data being
left out.
Corpus data and methodology are designed to document naturally occurring language in more
or  less  naturalistic  settings,  noisy though they are.  Thus,  we can  assume that  corpus  data  and
methodology can be useful in gaining an understanding of the interplay between cultural models
and verbal behavior and also as a means of inferring cultural models from verbal behavior, defined
in  this  article  as  covering  both  speech and writing.  Stefanowitsch's  (2004)  analysis  of  cultural
metaphors  of  HAPPINESS in  German  and  English  and,  more  indirectly,  Ooi's  (2000)  study  of
collocations in Asian varieties of English suggest that lexical analysis of corpus-data may reveal
underlying cultural concepts. Likewise, Gries & Stefanowitsch (2004) show that cultural models
may emerge in  the analysis  of  constructional  phenomena in corpora.  The important  take-home
lesson  from  Gries  &  Stefanowitsch  (2004)  is  that  constructional  semantics,  just  like  lexical
semantics, may link up with and thus serve as a vehicle for cultural models. Consequently,  the
discursive  behavior  of  constructions  in  a  corpus  may also  be  indicative  of  underlying  cultural
models.
The present article has investigated the extent to which the discursive behavior of the [too
ADJ to V]-construction, as described in Jensen (2014a, 2014b, 2014c; see also Fortuin 2013, 2014),
may be said to be reflective of cultural models. The construction is characterized by an implicit
relation of force-dynamics, such that the [too ADJ]-element is construed as PREVENTING the scenario
predicated by the [to V]-element. Thus, looking at the interaction between lexemes in the ADJ- and
V-positions  via  the method of  covarying collexeme analysis  is  helpful  in  identifying culturally
filtered force-dynamic relations of prevention (and, of course, cognitively universal ones, such as
DARKNESS PREVENTING SEEING).  Focusing on the  following instantiations  [too young to V],  [too
proud to V], and [too macho to V], we were able to identify patterns of attraction within the three
adjectives' respective ranges of coattracted verbs in the construction. We found that young tends to
coattract  verbs  of  cognition  and  evaluation,  suggesting  a  cultural  perception  of  young  age
preventing, or at least diminishing, efficient cognitive activities.  Proud and  macho both relate to
cultural-psychological states and their engenderment in the behavior of people whose personality
they are  parts  of.  Analyzing  the  verbs  that  they coattract  in  the  COCA revealed  a  number  of
situations that, in the American cultural perception of proud and macho individuals, appear to be
face-threatening to such individuals and are thus prevented by high degrees of PRIDE and MACHISMO.
The present study suggests that it is possible to infer aspects of force-dynamic cultural models
from the ranges of verbs coattracted to young (and old), proud, and macho in the [too ADJ to V]-
construction, and consequently from the discursive behavior of the construction itself. Of course,
the present study has had a quite limited scope, as our focus has been on the BLOCKAGE-involving
PREVENTION subtype of the construction and not the ENABLEMENT subtype. Moreover, we have only
looked at blockage-based relations in three cultural domains – namely, AGE, PRIDE, and MACHISMO –
so this study cannot be said to be an exhaustive investigation of the cognitive-cultural implications
of the [too ADJ  to V]-construction.  However,  this exploratory corpus-based study has arguably
enabled us to at least partially infer semantic relations based on BLOCKAGE that are very likely to be
part  of  cultural  models.  Thus,  corpus  data  and  methodology,  here  represented  by  COCA and
covarying collexeme analysis, are useful in the inferring of cultural models from naturalistic verbal
behavior.  Of  course,  in  order  to  specify more  precisely the  extent  to  which  these  relations  of
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blockage  are  culture-specific,  a  comparative  study  would  be  required  which  compares  the
discursive behavior of the construction in American English to its behavior in other varieties of
English or which compares the construction to a corresponding construction in a different language.
Such a study would be extremely interesting in the perspective of cognitive linguistics, cognitive
anthropology, and intercultural communication studies. While this study has shown the potential
value of corpus data and methodology as a way to analyze the interplay between verbal behavior
and cultural models, corpus data and methodology alone will not enable us to fully infer cultural
models in their entirety.
Corpus-based analysis of the discursive behavior of constructions and provides us with an
empirical means to partially infer cultural models from verbal behavior. Arguably, corpus data and
methodology would contribute importantly to cognitive scientists' endeavor in identifying cultural
models if deployed in a triangulatory framework alongside the experimental methods already used
in cognitive anthropology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive linguistics.
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